This paper studies asset markets where Knightian uncertainty about the fundamentals can be mitigated through costly information acquisition. In these markets, investors'information choices can be strategic complements, resulting in multiple equilibria, history-dependent prices, and large price swings occurring after small changes in uncertainty. Our model makes a number of predictions about the market response to uncertainty shocks, including crashes, followed by sustained rallies and price overshoots, and switches in information regimes, which the model generates due to the information complementarities. Our model highlights uncertainty as a new channel for episodes of extreme price volatility and media frenzies.
Introduction
One standard assumption in …nancial economics is that rational decision makers are able to …gure out the probability distribution of the events that a¤ect asset prices. "Ambiguity," or Knightian uncertainty, is an alternative way to describe the information context where agents operate. In a world of Knightian uncertainty, some events cannot be assigned an obvious probability distribution. The literature on the impact of Knightian uncertainty and ambiguity aversion on asset prices is expanding at a fast pace (e.g., Wang, 1994, 1995; Uppal and Wang, 2003; Maenhout, 2004; Cao, Wang and Zhang, 2005; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Epstein and Schneider, 2008; Hansen and Sargent, 2008; Leippold, Trojani and Vanini, 2008; Ozsoylev and Werner, 2008; Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens, 2009; Caskey, 2009; Easley and O'Hara, 2009; Gagliardini, Porchia and Trojani, 2009; Bossaert, Ghirardato, Guarneschelli and Zame, 2010; Condie and Ganguli, 2010; Epstein and Schneider, 2010; Gollier, 2010) . Two common assumptions in this literature are that (i) investors are symmetrically informed about the asset payo¤s or that, alternatively, (ii) investors with less information do not attempt to resolve their uncertainty by learning from the observed price or do not consider a market for information.
In this paper, we consider a market where investors are ex-ante uninformed about the expected value of the asset fundamentals, and display ambiguity aversion: in formulating decisions about portfolio holdings and information acquisition, agents fear extreme events and worst-case scenarios. Our departure from the previous analyses of Knightian uncertainty in …nancial markets and macroeconomics is the assumption that the very same agents might resolve their ambiguity, by purchasing information. Those who indeed do so, pay a (constant) cost, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . Those who choose to remain uninformed, instead, cannot entirely resolve their uncertainty about the fundamentals, even after having learned about the equilibrium asset price.
In this market, the value of information is higher than in markets without ambiguity, such as that in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . In spite of this property, we show that agents who are informed and agents who remain uninformed and, hence, ambiguity averse, coexist, in equilibrium. In fact, we show that a multiplicity of equilibria may occur, as a result of strategic complementarities in the process of information acquisition: the larger the mass of informed agents, the higher the incentives to become informed. Complementaries in information acquisition are at the root of many interesting properties our model generates, such as non-Markovian prices, market crashes and varying levels of informational e¢ ciency, including media frenzies, media neglects, and episodes of extreme volatility. These properties are, of course, in common with other models that feature strategic complementarities in information acquisition (e.g., Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992; Veldkamp, 2006; Barlevi and Veronesi, 2000, 2008; Chamley, 2008; García and Strobl, 2008; Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009 ). However, the economic rationale behind our results is quite distinct.
In a market with aversion towards uncertainty, information acquisition is driven by two opposing forces. On the one hand, there is a standard strategic substitutability e¤ect, by which an increase in the number of informed agents leads to more informative prices, which reduces the incentives to acquire information. On the other hand, it is well-known since at least Dow and Werlang (1992) that in the presence of uncertainty aversion, there is an interval of prices within which the agents neither buy nor sell short the asset. In our model, the probability distribution of the asset price is determined in equilibrium, and so is the extent of the agents' market participation. When nobody purchases information, the uninformed investors always have to trade to clear the market. Instead, the equilibrium price may well take values leading uninformed investors not to trade, in the presence of informed investors, who then step in to clear the market. Accordingly, in the equilibrium of our model, the extent of market participation of the uninformed investors decreases as the mass of informed agents increases. This reduced market participation leads asset prices to be misaligned from the fundamentals, even more so than in markets without ambiguity, to the entire bene…t of the informed agents. Therefore, in the presence of ambiguous fundamentals: (i) information is more valuable than in a market without ambiguity; and (ii) as the mass of informed agents increases, investors may want to buy information that others have, to avoid being hurt from reduced market participation.
The asset price swings our model generates, arise as the outcome of a coordination problem. Consider an asset market where uncertainty about the fundamentals is small. In this market, the incentives to become informed are low, and so is the number of informed agents. Next, suppose that uncertainty increases. For example, exogenous developments might lead to widen the set of possible scenarios a¤ecting the asset expected payo¤s. As the market undergoes these developments, the number of agents who purchase information may stay constant or increase in a continuous fashion, but only up to some critical point, where the market for information enters a media frenzy: the number of agents who desire to acquire information becomes suddenly very high. The critical point occurs precisely when information complementarities kick in: as the number of informed agents increase, information becomes more desirable, to an extent where the market experiences a change in regime characterized by a discrete jump in the number of informed investors. In this new, informationally more e¢ cient market, the uncertainty premium is much lower, and the asset price promptly increases as a result, although then, it may precipitate again, following an uncertainty shrinkage su¢ ciently large to trigger new information complementarities where information is not desirable by any agent, and the market for information dries up. The market we analyze, then, may be cycling around media frenzies, media neglects, and discrete price changes, as a result of changes in uncertainty.
A multi-period extension of our model suggests that to this cycling may correspond market crashes, rebounds and overshoots, and switches in information regimes, arising as a result of the occurrence of an uncertainty shock. In this extension, the market crashes after an uncertainty shock, due to a friction in the market for information: although agents rush to acquire new information, the market for information cannot entirely satisfy the new demand but with some delay, which leads to a sudden, but temporary, increase in the uncertainty premium induced by the uninformed investors. But as soon as information delays are absorbed, strategic complementarities channel a sustained process of information acquisition, leading to a rapid reduction in the uncertainty premium and, then, a market rally. Our model predicts price overshoots, again, precisely because of the information complementarities: whilst information delays dissipate and demand for new information is satis…ed, the market leans towards a new regime, where the asset price is informationally more e¢ cient and, hence, even higher than before the shock.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the model. Section 3 describes the process of information acquisition and Section 4 analyzes the properties of the model, such as information complementarities, multiple equilibria and the price swings occurring as a result. Section 5 presents the multi-period market. Section 6 concludes. The Appendices contain details omitted from the main text.
Model

Agents and assets
We consider a market for a risky asset, with payo¤ equal to f = + , where N ( ; ! ) and N (0; ! ). As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , the market is populated by a continuum of agents, with a fraction of informed agents and a fraction 1 of uninformed agents. Informed agents observe at cost c > 0. The asset supply is z N ( z ; ! z ) and prevents information to be fully revealed in equilibrium. A riskless asset is also available for trading, which is in perfectly elastic supply, and yields a rate of return equal to zero. All agents have negative exponential utility, with constant absolute risk aversion .
Our point of departure from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is the assumption that all agents are ex-ante uncertain about the expected value of the fundamentals. Although they are unable to assess what is, they believe it belongs to some interval, 2 [ ; ]; where for some 0, we assume that = 0 1 2 and = 0 + 1 2
. We set 0 = 0. The length of this interval, , measures the degree of ambiguity that the investors face in the market. We assume that agents display ambiguity aversion in the form of maxmin expected utility, as formalized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) (see below) . We initially take the value of as given, although a fundamental purpose of the paper is to determine this value endogenously, as a result of the information acquisition process. In Section 4, we comment on a variant of the model solved in Appendix C, where uncertainty about cannot be resolved, in that paying a cost c > 0 would only lead to shrink the degree of ambiguity from to , with 2 (0; 1).
Informed agents
By observing the realization of , informed agents resolve their ambiguity straight away, and choose portfolio holdings so as to maximize,
where W I = (f p) x I c, p is the observed asset price and, …nally, x I is the asset demand, given by:
Naturally, while informed agents are able to dissipate their uncertainty about , they cannot eliminate risk: conditionally upon , the fundamentals, f , are still normally distributed with expectation and variance ! , as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) .
Uninformed agents
The uncertainty about the expected value of the fundamentals, , leads the uninformed agents to choose portfolio holdings, so as to maximize,
where W U = (f p) x U , x U is the asset demand, and E ( ) is de…ned to be the expectation operator taken under the assumption E ( ) = . The criterion underlying Eq. (1) is the celebrated maxmin expected utility representation of aversion to Knightian uncertainty, introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . We conjecture that for every pair ( ; z), the equilibrium price function is P ( ; z). We look for an equilibrium where the uninformed agents sell the asset when the price is su¢ ciently high and buy the asset when the price is su¢ ciently low, in a sense to be made precise below. As we shall show, this search process leads to a simpler problem, in which the uninformed agents'concern is to determine the expectation of the fundamentals in the states of nature in which they buy and sell. Accordingly, let us introduce the following notation,
We conjecture that the solution to the uninformed agents'problem is,
In words, the uninformed agents do not participate in the market if the observed equilibrium price does not take a su¢ ciently favorable value. This value has to be such that the agents believe that in the worst-case scenario, they can actually make pro…ts, on "average." In particular, the uninformed agents enter the market as buyers (sellers) when the price realization, p, is less (larger) than the agents'worst-case scenario expectation of the asset value, conditional upon p. Hence, the decision to participate involves a …xed-point problem, in which the expectation of the asset value, conditional on the price realization, is equal to the very same price realization, in equilibrium,
The uninformed agents do not participate in the asset market if the equilibrium price realization, p, is such that p 2 [p; p]. Naturally, the cuto¤s p and p are endogenous, and we shall verify that in equilibrium, they satisfy p < p.
Equilibrium
We conjecture that the equilibrium price function is, P ( ; z) = P (s ( ; z)), where s ( ; z) is the compound signal, de…ned as,
From the market clearing condition,
we easily see that the compound signal is observationally equivalent to the equilibrium price. Therefore, the equilibrium in this market is also one in which uninformed agents condition the expectation of the asset value conditional upon the observation of the compound signal. We have:
Proposition I. The equilibrium price is piecewise linear in the compound signal, 
where ! s is the variance of s in Eq. (4). Finally, we have that p < p, where the expressions for p and p are given in the Appendix A. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium price in Proposition I. The solid line is the price schedule arising in the presence of ambiguity, > 0. The dashed line is the benchmark price in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model. In the top panel, the proportion of informed agents is = 0:2, while in the bottom panel, = 0:5. In equilibrium, the uninformed agents'portfolio choice, as formalized in Eq. (2), re ‡ects the expected returns in the worst-case scenarios: the uninformed agents buy when s < s (sell when s > s), but less aggressively than they would do in the absence of ambiguity. Such a pessimistic behavior leads to a price lower (higher) than the benchmark for low (high) realizations of the compound signal, s. As the proportion of informed agents, , increases, the price impact of uninformed (and ambiguity averse) agents is reduced, and so is the extent of this price impact, as illustrated by Figure 1 . When the compound signal, s, lies within the range [s; s], the uninformed agents do not participate in the market. Proposition I tells us that the non-participation region, s s, is proportional to the size of the ambiguity in the market, . The proportionality factor, ! , is the risk-bearing capacity of the informed agents, de…ned as the mass of informed agents, , times their trading aggressiveness, 1 ! . As the informed risk-bearing capacity increases, prices move towards fundamentals. It now takes more extreme realizations of the compound signal, s, for prices to be favorable enough and induce uninformed agents to trade, in equilibrium. Therefore, the non-participation region widens as the informed risk-bearing capacity increases.
The non-participation region is proportional to for the following reasons. Consider the comparative statics of a change in and . If increases, E buy ( f j P ( ; ) = p) increases as well, for each price realization p, but then the threshold equilibrium price at which the agent does not buy the asset, p, has to increase, by the …xed point problem de…ned by Eqs. (3). This requires that s increase. A similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that as decreases, s does necessarily have to decrease as well.
Finally, this market exhibits a partial revelation feature about the information the price transmits to uninformed investors. By observing the price, the uninformed investors learn about the fundamentals, in that they experience a reduction in their initial uncertainty about the expected payo¤s:
for each price realization p (see Appendix A). However, the shrinkage in uncertainty is incomplete, as the …rst inequality in (7) reveals. In other words, the price does not reveal all the information informed investors have, only a portion of it. Note that this property arises in our model, due to the standard assumption the asset supply is random (with known probability distribution). In a paper with a focus di¤erent from ours, Condie and Ganguli (2010) actually demonstrate a much stronger result, namely that in markets with Knightian uncertainty, prices can be partially revealing even in the absence of noise trading.
Information acquisition
This section analyzes how ambiguity a¤ects the incentives to acquire fundamental information, and solve for the endogenous fraction of informed agents, . As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , agents need to evaluate their expected utilities, before deciding whether to become informed or not. However, the process of information acquisition di¤ers from that in Grossman and Stiglitz, in that all agents are ex-ante ambiguity averse, which leads them to assess future events at the worst-case scenarios.
In the remainder, we shall refer to "ex-ante" utilities as the unconditional expected utilities, i.e. the expected utilities the agents receive prior to trading. Instead, we de…ne "interim" utilities as the expected utilities conditional upon the information available to agents when they trade.
Uninformed agents
The ex-ante expected utility for a would-be uninformed agent is:
where v U (s) is the interim utility for the uninformed agents, de…ned as
By Eq. (4), the compound signal s is normally distributed, with mean s ( ) and variance ! s , where,
In Appendix B, we provide a closed-form expression for the unconditional expectation of the interim utility:
where ( ; ; !) denotes the cumulative function of a normal variate with mean and variance !. Figure 2 depicts the interim utility, v U (s), and the density function d of the compound signal, s. The interim utility achieves its minimum in the non-participation region, where the interim certainty equivalent C U (s) is ‡at at zero. Moreover, it is monotonically symmetrically increasing as the compound signal moves away from the non-participating thresholds s and s. The next proposition provides the solution to the problem in Eq. (8):
Proposition II. Let z 0. Then, the ex-ante expected utility of the uninformed agents, U U ( ; ), is minimized at,
The intuition underlying Proposition II is the following. The uninformed and, hence, ambiguity averse agents attach the largest probability to the occurrence of the worst case scenario events, and choose in such a way that the expected value of the signal, s ( ) in Eq. (10), is as close as possible to the midpoint of the non-participation region,ŝ = 1 2 (s + s), as illustrated by Figure 2 . Naturally, U ( ) is increasing in the average asset supply, z : following an increase in z , for markets to clear, agents must absorb a larger supply of the asset. Since uninformed agents buy the asset for realizations of the signal below the non-participation region, and both the signal distribution and the length of the non-participation region are una¤ected by z , the interval [s; s] has to shift to the right to in ‡ate the probability uninformed agents enter the market as buyers. Therefore, the events leading to the lowest levels of the interim utility-the worst case scenario-occur for larger realizations of the compound signal, and s ( ) increases to match as closely as possible these lowest levels of the utilities, thereby leading to the minimization problem of the ex-ante expected utility in Eq. (8). where the interim utility attains its minimum. Accordingly, the interim utility is given the largest probability weight atŝ = 1 2 (s + s). The vertical dashed line connects the probability density to the interim utility at the pointŝ. Parameters values are = 2, ! = ! = ! z = = 1, = 0:1, and z = 1. The resulting value ofŝ is 1:01.
Informed agents
The ex-ante expected utility for a would-be informed agent is,
where v I ( ; s) is the interim utility for any informed agent, de…ned as
and the equilibrium price, P (s), is as in Eqs. (6) of Proposition I. In Appendix B, we provide a closed-form expression for the unconditional expectation of the interim utility,
where ! f js denotes the variance of the fundamentals, f , conditional on the compound signal s, and v I (s; ) is some negative function de…ned in Appendix B (see Eq. (A9)).
The value of information
An equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition is de…ned in the usual way, as the fraction of informed agents, 2 [0; 1], that makes any agent ex-ante indi¤erent whether to be informed or not, U I (c; ) = U U ( ), or, 1
where I and U solve the two problems in Eqs. (8) and (11). The ratio on the left hand side of Eq. (14) is the value of information, evaluated at . Due to negative exponential utility, lower values of this ratio are indicative of higher values of information. The value of information is the product of two terms. The …rst term is the usual value of information in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model, the benchmark without ambiguity, = 0. It summarizes the usual trade-o¤ between the cost of acquiring information and its bene…ts, in terms of the informational advantage over the uninformed fringe, and it is monotonically increasing in . The e¤ect of ambiguity on the incentives to acquire fundamental information is captured by the additional term in Eq. (14), which we label "ambiguity aversion e¤ect."The next proposition relates ambiguity to the value of information:
Proposition III. Let > 0. Then, the ratio (14) is less then one. That is, information is more valuable in a market with ambiguous fundamentals ( > 0) than in a market without ambiguity ( = 0).
The additional bene…ts of collecting fundamental information, due to the presence of ambiguous fundamentals, can be better understood by comparing the welfare of both types of agents to a benchmark without ambiguity. First, for any realization of the fundamentals, uninformed agents trade lower quantities than if there was no ambiguity (or if they were ambiguity neutral), as explained in Section 2. Therefore, by giving up investment opportunities, uninformed agents experience lower expected utility. This reduction in welfare is actually reinforced from an ex-ante perspective: while assessing the outcomes arising from being uninformed at the trading stage, agents attach the largest probability weight to those future states in which participation is the lowest, as formalized in Proposition II and illustrated in Figure 2 . Second, informed investors bene…t from the price impact of uninformed and ambiguity-averse investors, as illustrated in Figure 1 : they can buy at lower prices and sell at higher prices, thus making higher pro…ts. Finally, note the following implication of Proposition III: since the value of information increases in the presence of ambiguity, the amount of resources spent on collecting information is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in markets without ambiguity, as formalized by Corollary I in Appendix B.
Information complementarities, multiple equilibria and price swings
Complementarities in information acquisition arise when the incentives to acquire information become stronger with the size of informed agents. This section analyzes conditions leading to this situation, and their implications for the asset price.
Complementarities in information acquisition
The following proposition identi…es su¢ cient conditions under which ambiguity leads to complementarities in the process of information acquisition:
Proposition IV. Let > 0. Then, there exists a level of the average asset supply z > 0, such that there are complementarities in information acquisition for all z > z .
As the fraction of informed agents increase, there are two opposing forces that a¤ect the incentives to acquire information. The …rst relates to the standard strategic substitutability e¤ect, which is well-known since Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) : more informed trading increases price e¢ ciency, thereby reducing the informational advantage of the informed agents above the uninformed. This e¤ect is still present in our model, as the …rst term in Eq. (14) is monotonically increasing in , as explained in Section 3.3. Our analysis uncovers a second e¤ect, speci…c to ambiguity, and captured by the second term in Eq. (14): the volume of uninformed trading decreases with the mass of informed agents, leading uninformed agents to be worse o¤, ex-ante. Proposition IV shows that the ambiguity aversion e¤ect may dominate the strategic substitutability e¤ect and, then, generate strategic complementarities in the process of information acquisition.
The role the average asset supply, z , plays in channelling information complementarities is subtle. First, note that the informed agents'ex-ante utility is also decreasing in , as a reduction in the mass of uninformed agents reduces the extent of the price impact informed agents bene…t from (see Figure  1 ). While this e¤ect might counter-balance the e¤ect an increase in exerts on relative welfare, it becomes less relevant for larger values of z . Consider, for example, a market populated by uninformed investors, = 0, where the price misalignment from the fundamentals is the highest. If the asset supply is su¢ ciently high, on average, agents are buyers most of the time. With uninformed investors holding the positive supply and being price setters, prices re ‡ect an ambiguity premium: low expected payo¤s, , translate into low prices. The worst-case scenario for an agent considering to become informed, then, is that the expected payo¤s are indeed low (i.e. I = ), such that the bene…ts arising from the ambiguity premium are small. If the ambiguity premium is low to start with, then, as increases, the shrinkage in the ex-ante utility of the informed investors is weak, compared to the loss in the ex-ante utility of the uninformed. As a result, the ambiguity aversion e¤ect in Eq. (14) strengthens with when z is large enough, and leads to information complementarities. Do these results arise by the assumption that informed agents resolve all of their ambiguity? It is not the case. In Appendix C, we consider a model where uncertainty cannot be resolved: paying a cost c > 0 leads informed agents to reduce their ambiguity from to , with 2 (0; 1). We show that complementarities in information acquisition arise even in this case. This result sheds further light on our …ndings: because the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) framework can only lead to strategic substitutability in information acquisition, then, clearly, information complementarities arise in our model, precisely because agents are averse towards ambiguity about the fundamentals.
Multiple equilibria, crashes and rebounds
Information complementarities may lead to multiple equilibria. As an illustration, Figure 3 displays the value of information, the ratio (14), as a function of , obtained with two degrees of ambiguity, . The solid line, which corresponds to = 1, leads to three equilibria. Two of these, = U and = S , are interior equilibria: the leftmost equilibrium ( U ) is unstable, and the rightmost ( S ) is stable. The third, and stable, equilibrium is that with = 0. As increases, the value of information increases, for each , and shifts the leftmost (unstable) equilibria to the left, and the rightmost (stable) equilibria to the right. When is su¢ ciently high, there remains one equilibrium only, and stable. The dashed line in Figure 3 , which corresponds to = 1:30, depicts an example of such a situation. Figure 4 , left panel, depicts the proportion of agents who acquire information, as a function of the size of ambiguity,
. We can interpret changes in as those that result in a repetition of twoperiod markets, as we further elaborate in the next section. When ambiguity is low, say = 0:5, the market is in its "media neglect" regime. If ambiguity increases, say to 1.30, the proportion of agents who become informed in the stable equilibrium increases by a discrete change: from zero, to nearly 75%, a "media frenzy" regime. As decreases back to, say, 0:8, the market for information precipitates again. The model, then, generates path-dependence: for any size of ambiguity between the two vertical dashed lines, the number of informed agents can be either zero or strictly positive, according to the previous values of . Figure 4 , right panel, depicts the unconditional expectation of the equilibrium price, assuming the asset is in positive supply, as a function of the size of ambiguity, when the proportion of agents who acquire information is determined endogenously, as in the left panel. A negative price, i.e. a price discount, re ‡ects the positive expected return required by the agents to hold the asset. The …gure shows how, for low levels of ambiguity, when the economy is in its "media neglect" regime, an increase in leads to a larger price discount, as the price re ‡ects the possible occurrence of increasingly more severe worst-case scenarios. As the size of ambiguity gets su¢ ciently large, and the economy shifts to its "media frenzy" regime, more investors purchase information. This jump in the size of informed agents implies a discrete reduction both in the price impact related to ambiguity aversion and in the conditional risk perceived by the market, which reduces the price discount. The average price jumps up as a result. Moreover, within this regime, the equilibrium fraction of informed agents increases with the size of ambiguity, such that higher values of lead to a lower price discount. Therefore, our model predicts a non-monotonic relation between the degree of Knightian uncertainty and uncertainty premia. Furthermore, the price inherits the same properties as those featured by the proportion of informed agents: it exhibits path-dependence and di¤erent jump sizes, according to whether the size of ambiguity is increasing or decreasing. Naturally, these properties relate to the unconditional expectation of the equilibrium price, as explained. The next section shows that in a multi-period extension of this model, these properties also arise conditionally, i.e. contingent upon any realization of the market fundamentals. 
Multi-period market
Information and equilibrium
We consider a sequence of two-period markets, in which the asset payo¤ as of time t is f t = t + t , where t denotes its "persistent" component,
and t and t are both independent and identically distributed with t N (0; ! ) and t N (0; 1), is the persistence parameter, and is the instantaneous volatility of t+1 = t . Finally, t is independent and identically drawn from some distribution with support [ ; ]. As in the static case, we denote = . In this setting, the equilibrium price is the same as that in Eq. (6) 
and z t denotes the asset supply, which for each t, is normally distributed as in Section 2.1. In the remainder, we rely on the following selection criterion in the presence of multiple equilibria: if t 1 is a stable equilibrium at time t; then t = t 1 ; otherwise, t is selected to be the stable equilibrium closest to t 1 .
Predictions
Price dynamics
We compare the price dynamics predicted by our model with those generated by the Grossman and Stiglitz (multi-period) market, arising when = 0. To make this comparison apply to markets where the value of information has the same order of magnitude, we …x the information cost c in our model and, then, search for the information cost in the Grossman-Stiglitz market such that the average value of information equals the corresponding value in the market with ambiguity, over all the simulations. Moreover, to avoid generating additional price volatility, we center the ambiguity size, , around t , and set t = 1. Figure 5 shows that the prices in the market with ambiguity are more volatile than those without. The rationale underlying the price swings in this …gure relate both to the information complemen-tarities and to the ambiguity discounts our model generates. High realizations of the fundamentals amplify price movements through a shift in the information demand, similarly as in Veldkamp (2006) : an increase in the value of the fundamentals, t , leads to an increased conditional variance, var ( t+1 j t ) = 2 2 t , which results in a higher value of information. Information complementarities arise when the increase in t reaches a critical value such that the agents coordinate to switch from an equilibrium with information neglects to one with information frenzies. The discrete increase in the information e¢ ciency of this regime ultimately raises the asset price above the benchmark. Instead, when fundamentals are low, so are the value of information and information demand. In this regime, the degree of ambiguity faced in markets is the highest, and the resulting high required returns, or ambiguity discounts, make prices fall substantially. This e¤ect is peculiar to our model, and implies that the price overshoots the benchmark without ambiguity in all regimes, not only when the demand for information is positive.
The impact of an uncertainty shock
What is the price impact of an uncertainty shock? We address this issue by assuming uncertainty is a persistent process subject to jumps: once an uncertainty shock hits the market, it is absorbed gradually, such that uncertainty reverts to its long-run value ,
where is the persistence parameter, and J t is the uncertainty shock, which is independent and identically binomially distributed with a "small"frequency p. The parameter de…nes the size of the uncertainty shock. We assume t is observed at time t, prior to the trading stage, but after information choices are made.
We consider a market where successive generations of traders work in long-lived …nancial institutions. Traders have a one-period investment horizon, and trade a short-lived asset, a claim to the dividend process with the persistent component in Eq. (15). We assume that …nancial institutions entertain long-term information contracts, in that in each period, these contracts can only be dissolved with some probability 1 . Moreover, we assume the market of information is sticky on the upside as well, in that it takes time for this market to entirely absorb new demand for information and that as a result, new contracts can only be purchased with some probability 1 . To summarize, every trader in his generation initially inherits the information choice (whether to purchase costly information or not) of the preceding trader he replaces. However, every new trader might successfully be satis…ed with his information choice. In each period, then, only a fraction (1 ) of the new (positive or negative) demand for information is satis…ed: Figure 6 displays the model's predictions about the impact of an uncertainty shock, once we freeze the signal s t in Eq. (16) to zero. In the top panels, we compare the price response in the market with ambiguity but with uninformed agents, with the response in the market with endogenous information acquisition, assuming the market for information is sticky, with t as in Eq. (18), and = 90%. An uncertainty shock has an immediate negative price impact on both markets: the markets crash, as the agents are caught by surprise by the uncertainty shock and, then, demand, suddenly, a sizeable ambiguity premium. In a market where agents cannot acquire information, the uncertainty shock is absorbed, but only gradually, with uncertainty exogenously reverting to its long-run value, as shown in the bottom-right panel.
In a market with endogenous information acquisition, instead, the agents'incentives to purchase information lead them to remove the ambiguity premium occurred after the uncertainty shock. As a consequence, the asset price recovers quickly. In fact, the price overshoots, as it becomes more informative than it was prior to the uncertainty shock, with uncertainty (endogenously) resolving faster than in the market without information acquisition. The top-right panel and the bottomleft panel also depict a market with a lower cost of information, which remains "trapped" in a new equilibrium regime where the information demand remains positive, due to the information complementarities, even after the absorption of the uncertainty shock. In this new regime, more e¢ cient prices sustain persistently higher asset valuations.
Does the model help explain the actual market response to an uncertainty shock? Figure 7 depicts the impulse-response function of the aggregate stock market to an uncertainty shock, estimated through a VAR model including monthly stock returns and a series of uncertainty shocks, from January 1957 to December 2008. Stock returns are those based upon the Fama and French (1993) market benchmark, and uncertainty shocks are those identi…ed by Bloom (2009) , which we use to de…ne a time series which takes a value equal to one during the month when the shock took place, and zero otherwise. We control these estimates for the economic conditions under which the uncertainty shocks occurred, by feeding the VAR with the corporate spread and the term spread (de…ned as in Fama and French, 1989) , the dividend yield, and the recession indicator calculated by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Appendix D provides additional details about these data and the VAR methodology we employ, as well as a disaggregated description of the uncertainty shocks we use and subsequent market developments. Figure 7 reveals a clear pattern: the aggregate stock market plummets after an uncertainty shock, although, then, it rebounds rapidly and overshoots for several months. A simple explanation for these rallies is that uncertainty resolves quickly. However, anecdotal evidence suggests uncertainty shocks persist for more than just two or three months. Moreover, a mere exogenous reduction in uncertainty by itself is, arguably, unlikely to generate price overshoots. The model's predictions in this section suggest an explanation of these market movements, based on a sustained information acquisition process, which results from an higher value of information due to the uncertainty shock. Our model actually predicts two possible outcomes, as explained: one, where prices revert to their level before the shock, as in the top-left bottom of Figure 6 , and a second, where information acquisition leads to a change in the information regime, with a boosted stock market. These two outcomes might account for a variety of uncertainty episodes, such as those documented in Appendix D, which can possibly exert di¤erent market impacts, on top of the average impact summarized by Figure 7 .
Conclusion
How does Knightian uncertainty a¤ect asset markets in contexts where agents have diverse information? We show that when Knightian uncertainty can be mitigated through costly information acquisition, agents may be led to "correlated choices," in that their incentives to acquire new information increase with the fraction of investors who already have purchased information. The origins of these strategic complementarities relate to endogenous market participation: as more agents purchase fundamental information, ambiguity-averse agents would simply be more likely to step out of the market, and forego investment opportunities, if left without a chance to acquire information. The fear of being damaged from restricted market participation provides these agents with an incentive to acquire information that others have. The implications of these information choices are the existence of multiple equilibria and, then, price discontinuities, whereby even small changes in the uncertainty about fundamentals might lead prices to undergo episodes of large ‡uctuations, mainly driven by abrupt changes in information demand. How restricted stock market participation relates to Knightian uncertainty is well-understood in the macro-…nance literature surveyed in the Introduction. The theme of this paper was to study how Knightian uncertainty impinges upon restricted stock market participation, endogenously, in markets plagued with asymmetric information. These markets might function quite di¤erently from those initially studied by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) .
Appendices
Appendix A: Proofs for Section 2 Proof of Proposition I. By the market clearing condition, Eq. (5), the equilibrium price arising when the uninformed agents do not participate is:
which is the second line in Eqs. (6). Next, we compute the uninformed agents' expectation of the asset payo¤, in the states of nature in which these agents participate. Using ! s = ! 2 ! + ! z , straight forward computations leave:
Next, we plug Eqs. (A1)-(A2) into the demand schedule, Eq. (2), replace the result into the market clearing condition, Eq. (5), conjecture the piece-wise linear price function in Eqs. (6), and solve for undetermined coe¢ cients, obtaining,
Finally, we determine the threshold for the compound signal, s and s. We use the cuto¤ conditions in Eq. (3). As for s, consider the …rst equation, E buy f j P ( ; ) = p = p. For s s, the conjectured price function is linear in s. Therefore, we solve for p by equivalently solving for s in the following condition,
where E buy ( f j S = s) is given by Eq. (A1), and the second equality holds by the …rst line of the conjectured price function in Eqs. (6). We do the same to determine s, by solving, where E sell ( f j S = s) is given by Eq. (A2). The expressions for s and s given in Proposition I then follow by simple computations. Finally, we need to compute the threshold prices p and p. We plug Eqs. (A1)-(A2) into Eq. (3), use the price function in Eqs. (6), and obtain,
The previous expressions con…rm that p < p.
Proof of Eq. (7). Follows by Eqs. (A1)-(A2).
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 3
Remark on notation. To alleviate the notation, we …x ( ) ( ; 0; 1).
Derivation of the utilities for the would-be uninformed and informed agents.
Would-be uninformed agents. By Eqs. (A1)- (A2), we have,
where ! f js is the variance of f conditional on s, P (s) is the equilibrium price in Eqs. (6) of Proposition I, and:
By using the expression for the certainty equivalent given in Eq. (9) of the main text, the interim utility is,
Integrating over the distribution of the compound signal, s, leaves:
where s ( ) is as in Eq. (10) of the main text, and:
A direct computation of these integrals yields,
where,
Would-be informed agents. Let js ( ) and ! js denote the conditional expectation and variance of given s, which are easily shown to be:
By the expression for the certainty equivalent in Eq. (12) of the main text, the expectation of the interim utility, conditional upon the observation of the signal, is,
where, again s ( ) is as in Eq. (10), and:
Computing the integrals yields,
where P (s) is the equilibrium price in Eqs. (6) of Proposition I. Replacing P (s) and the expression for js (s; ) in Eq. (A5) into Eq. (A7), leaves:
where, forŝ = 1 2 (s + s) and de…ned as in Eq. (A3),
Finally, substituting Eq. (A8) into Eq. (A6), and integrating, leaves Eq. (13) in the main text, with
Proof of Proposition II. We claim that s ( ) =ŝ 1 2 (s + s), or equivalently, that for all > 0, In terms of h 1 and h 2 , we have, v U (s) = h 1 (s) I fs ŝ+ 1 2 g + h 2 (s) I fs ŝ+ 1 2 g , where I f g denotes the indicator function, and the expression for U U in (A10) is,
where the second equality follows by the symmetry of v U (s) aboutŝ.
Proof of Proposition III. Consider the indi¤erence condition in Eq. (14). We wish to show that for > 0,
Because E I [ v I (s; )] and E U [v U (s)] are both strictly negative, the previous inequality holds true if:
where we de…ne, as in the main text:
To show that (A11) is true, suppose the contrary, i.e. that:
By direct comparison of Eq. (A4) and Eq. (A9), we have that 0 > v I (s; ) v U (s) for all 2 ; , and s 2 R, the second inequality being strict on some open set in R. As a consequence, we must have the inequality,
which, combined with (A12), yields,
The following corollary follows directly by Proposition III:
Corollary I. Information is purchased by more agents in the presence of ambiguity than in markets without ambiguity.
Proof of Corollary I. Let ( ) solve the indi¤erence condition:
Assume now that (0) ( ), for some > 0. By Proposition III, this cannot be the case as we would have
Proof of Proposition IV. We wish to show that
We are now ready to compute I 0 , J 0 , I 1 and J 1 .
As for I 0 , note that, clearly, I 0 = min (I buy + I sell ). Therefore, by Lemma 1, and a simple computation, we have that for all z ^ z , and with^ z as in the proof of Lemma 1, where
The ex-ante utilities of the informed agents are, instead,
where, The value of information, arising for = 10 (the solid line), leads to three equilibria: two of these are interior, = S (stable) and = U (unstable); the third one is that with = 1 (stable). Increasing to 10:5 leads to a unique equilibrium, that with = 1.
Appendix D: Description of data and VAR methodology in Section 5
The impulse-response function in Figure 7 , and the con…dence bands around it, relate to a VAR(6) model with two endogenous variables: (i) the series of aggregate stock market returns of Fama and French (1993) , and (ii) a series of uncertainty shocks, de…ned to be always zero, except during the month when an uncertainty event takes place, in which case the shock series equals one. All data are monthly, and span the period from January 1957 to December 2008. The uncertainty shock series is the "…rst volatility" event series identi…ed by Bloom (2009) (Table A .1, p. 676). It equals one on the …rst months a stock market volatility index (de…ned below) is higher than two standard deviations above the Hodrick-Prescott detrended (with parameter 129,600) mean of the same volatility series. As regards the sampling period 1986-2008, the stock market volatility series is the CBOE VXO index of implied volatility for one month at-the-money options on the S&P100. As for the 1957-1985 period, when the CBOE index is not available, stock market volatility is de…ned as the monthly standard deviation of the daily returns on the S&P500 index, normalized to have the same mean and standard deviation of the VXO index for the period 1986-2008. Table A .1 contains a description of the uncertainty events, as well as the market returns during and after the events. Each of the two equations of the VAR(6) is also fed by the current values of (i) the corporate spread, de…ned as the di¤erence between the baa industrial bond yield and the ten year Government bond yield;
(ii) the term spread, de…ned as the di¤erence between the ten year government bond yield and the yield on three month Treasury Bills; (iii) the price-dividend ratio on the S&P500 index; (iv) the National Bureau of Economic Research recession indicator. All data are collected from the Global Financial Data database, with the exception of the Fama and French market returns, which are taken from Kenneth French webpage. We compute the …rst two moments of the posterior distribution of the impulse-response function of the VAR, by simulations. First, we simulate the VAR coe¢ cients, drawing them from a normal distribution centered at the point coe¢ cient estimates, and variance-covariance matrix equal to S (X | X) 1 , where X is the matrix containing the series of exogenous variables and the lagged endogenous variables, and S is the variancecovariance matrix of the VAR residuals, assumed to have a Normal-inverse Wishart posterior distribution, S 1 Wishart((TŜ) 1 ; T P ), andŜ is the point estimate of S, T is the sample size and P is the dimension of each series in X. For each simulation, we compute the impulse-response function of stock market returns to a one standard deviation change in the uncertainty series, and aggregate across 5000 simulations to calculate the cross-sectional average and standard errors used to produce the market responses in Figure 7 .
